The ability to infer other people's mental states such as desires, emotions, intentions and beliefs is essential for successful social interactions, and it is usually referred to as theory of mind (ToM). In particular, the ability to detect and understand that people have beliefs about reality that may be false is considered an important hallmark of ToM. This experiment reports on the results of 18 participants who viewed photographic sequences of an actress performing actions as a consequence of true and false beliefs. Consistent with prior work, results from the passive viewing of stimuli depicting true belief indicated an increased response over frontal, central and parietal regions when compared with the amplitude for the false belief condition. These results show that (i) frontal activity is required for processing false belief tasks and (ii) parietal effects reported in previous studies to reflect specific cognitive process of monitoring others' beliefs can be elicited in the absence of an explicit instruction for mentalizing.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to understand the beliefs of other humans is important for almost every component of complex social cognition (Striano and Reid, 2006) . It is only through determining the belief structure of an observed individual that predictions for subsequent behavior can be generated by an observer (Dennett, 1978) . Further, the ability to dissociate another's beliefs from the reality of a situation is seen as a litmus test for a theory of mind (ToM) (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Meinhardt et al., 2011) . At present, most behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) studies on adult belief understanding use active paradigms in which the participant is required to provide explicit responses regarding others' mental states. Electrophysiological responses to the passive viewing of simple true and false belief paradigms have not to date been assessed. In isolation from recent adult ERP studies, behavioral studies with human infants have indicated that 15-month olds have the capacity to detect the mental states of others (Onishi and Baillaregeon, 2005) . Even though ERP paradigms are particularly well suited to work with developing populations, an ERP paradigm designed to investigate false belief discrimination in this population has yet to be developed. Consequently, the assessment of adult ERP responses to the processing of true and false belief in a paradigm that may be adaptable to infant populations is the aim of the present study.
Prior work has investigated electrophysiological mechanisms involved in the detection and processing of ToM. The overall ability to make inferences about others' mental states has been paired with specific ERP components. For instance, Sabbagh et al. (2004) have found the N240-400 component at left frontal locations, to be related with deciding what others are thinking or feeling based on the expression of their eyes. The electrical activity recorded at the frontal sites has also differentiated more specifically between reasoning about beliefs and reasoning about reality (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000) , and between true and false beliefs (Meinhardt et al., 2011) . A late positive complex (LPC) with characteristics specific to the P3 component showed increased positivity for belief reasoning vs reality reasoning or for false belief reasoning as compared to the true belief reasoning (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Meinhardt et al., 2011) . Larger amplitudes of the P3 for false belief reasoning at parietal locations are conjectured to suggest the involvement of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) in this type of mentalizing task (Meinhardt et al., 2011) .
Most of the mentalizing tasks developed for investigating false belief processing are simplified versions of classic behavioral tasks. This simplification is due to methodological requirements specific to ERP paradigms. Despite their relative simplicity, they trigger controlled cognitive processes that allow decoupling between beliefs and reality, as reflected in the appearance of a differentiating late slow wave (LSW) over frontal and parietal locations (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004 Liu et al., , 2009a Liu et al., , 2009b Meinhardt et al., 2011) , with the polarity conjectured to vary as a function of the complexity of mental state reasoning required in the task (Meinhardt et al., 2011) .
The current study seeks to extend false belief research by utilizing a paradigm that has traditionally been associated with studies that have focused on infant belief discrimination capabilities. This paradigm is derived from the one used by Onishi and Baillargeon (1995) , who found that infants at 15 months of age can discriminate between characters who have false or true beliefs. In this study, infants passively viewed the character's behavior, and their looking time varied as a function of the character's belief and behavior. We reasoned that were this passive paradigm to tap into elements of false belief processing, then similar adult ERP responses should be evident for this paradigm when compared to those reported previously for paradigms that require explicit responses (e.g. Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004 Liu et al., , 2009b Meinhardt et al., 2011) . This would allow us to compare the effects of passive vs active paradigms. Such a comparison would help determine if the nature of the paradigm, in terms of active behavioral response or passive viewing, may evidence similar neural correlates, despite different task requirements.
An assessment of belief processing via a passive ERP paradigm also allows us to draw stronger inferences with respect to infant performance on modified false belief tasks. Behavioral responses during infancy, like preferential looking time, are not without controversy (see Perner and Ruffman, 2005; Sirois and Jackson, 2007; Baillargeon and Scott, 2010) . Were similar neural correlates to be present for passive and active paradigms in adults, and for similar correlates to be present during infancy, then this may support, via a separate methodology, the contention that infants do track action based on processing complex social-cognitive characteristics such as beliefs.
The present study investigates the neural systems involved in false belief processing. Should activity be present in similar regions to those indicated in tasks requiring finger press responses that explicitly indicate true or false belief, we would be in a position to support the notion that the effects in those studies are related to cognitive demands rather than to aspects of processing related to the paradigm. We therefore conducted an ERP study with a passive paradigm designed to examine false belief processing in a manner that is analogous to paradigms used with infant populations. We predicted that effects would be elicited in frontal and parietal sites as a function of true or false belief, as prior work with adult populations and active paradigms has shown these areas to be involved in belief processing.
MATERIALS AND METHODS Participants
The final sample consisted of 18 adults (14 females), with a mean age of 22.7 years. Seven additional participants were tested but not included in the final sample because of technical difficulties with the equipment (N ¼ 4) or because they did not provide at least 20 artifact free trials per condition due to blinks, body movements and tiredness (N ¼ 3). All participants were recruited from an urban area in the UK, had a middle class background, and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli
A simplified non-verbal false belief task was developed for this study, similar to that used by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) . Sequences of events were depicted by successions of still photographs that could induce either a true or a false belief in the main character ( Figure 1 ). For both true-and false belief conditions, the first four still photographs showed a female character (with gaze hidden by a hat) reaching toward an object in front of her, placing the object in one of two boxes positioned to her left or right, and then recovering to the initial stationary position. In the next five photographs, a black occluder is raised, covering the characters' view of the scene, and then the object exits the box and either returns to the same box (reality preserved) or moves to the other box (reality changed). During the last sequence of photographs, the occluder is removed and the character reaches inside the box where she has initially placed the object, showing that she either has a true belief (when reality was preserved) or a false belief (when reality has changed) about the location of the object (Figure 1 ). Three objects were used alternatively across the trials (i.e. a bunch of bananas, an orange and a pepper). The color (i.e. blue and red) and position of the boxes were kept constant across trials. The box in which the character placed the object was counterbalanced across trials. The first 10 photographs in the entire sequence of 11 were presented for a total of 7 s. The last image, where the character reached into the box, remained on screen for 1000 ms.
EEG recording and analysis EEG was recorded continuously with Ag-AgCl electrodes from 32 scalp locations, referenced to FCz and re-referenced to the linked mastoids after data collection. The ground electrode was positioned at electrode position FP1. Data were amplified via a Neuroscan SynAmps amplifier. Bipolar horizontal (outer canthi) and vertical (above and below right eye) EOGs were recorded to control for artifacts caused by eye movements. The EEG was digitized at a 250-Hz sampling rate and stored on computer disk for the offline analysis using Neuroscan Compumedics (Charlotte, USA). A 0.1-40 Hz bandpass filter was applied to the data. For the elimination of electrical artifacts caused by eye and body movements, EEG data were rejected on a trial-by-trial basis whenever amplitude exceeded 80 V deviant from baseline amplitude at any electrode. In average, the participants contributed with 34.33 good trials (s.d. ¼ 7.15) to the false belief condition (7.22 rejected) and with 36 good trials (s.d. ¼ 6.35) to the true belief condition (6.83 rejected). Passively viewed sequences of true and false beliefs SCAN (2013) The EEG recordings were segmented into epochs of waveform that comprised 1000 ms, during the presentation of the last photograph where the character reaches into the box where she initially has placed the object, and a baseline consisting of the last 200 ms recorded during the frame immediately preceding the last one. For the statistical analysis of the data, we analyzed the differences in ERP waveforms recorded during the false belief and the true belief conditions. Previous studies have associated mental states reasoning with a LPC over frontal and parietal electrodes, a late slow-wave effect (LSW) in the same locations, as well as an increased negativity within a 270-400 ms window in the frontal electrodes (Liu et al., 2009b; Meinhardt et al., 2011; Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000) . We were interested whether the differences in the ERP waveforms recorded during the false belief and the true belief conditions in our study occur within similar locations and time windows. Visual inspection of the data recorded from all electrodes suggested the presence of a component with similar morphology to LPC within 185-275 ms time window at parietal (P3, P4, P7 and P8) and central/central-parietal locations (C3, C4, CP1, CP2, CP5 and CP6). Also, differences in the average amplitudes of the ERP waveform between conditions within 345-400 ms were evident at frontal electrode locations (FP1, FP2, F3, F4, F7, F8, FC5 and FC6) . A difference between conditions consistent with an LSW effect was present frontally (FP1, FP2, F3, F4, F7, F8, FC5, FC6, 620-685 ms, 785-840 ms), centrally (C3, C4, CP1, CP2, CP5, CP6, 570-690 ms) and parietally (P3, P4, P7, P8, 550-850 ms) (see Figure 2 for an overall view of all electrodes). In order to exclude the possibility that these observed effects are due to differences in the psychophysical properties of the two conditions, we also analyzed the ERP waveforms recorded at the occipital electrode locations (O1, O2, PO9 and PO10).
Procedure
Participants were briefed regarding the procedure, and informed consent was obtained. After the cap was fitted, participants sat in a dimly lit room, at a viewing distance of 90 cm from a 17-inch stimulus monitor. They were instructed to fixate their gaze in the centre of the screen in order to reduce their eye movements and to keep blinking and muscle movements, such as swallowing, to a minimum. The stimuli were presented at a viewing distance of 70 cm and were 43.18 Â 43.18 cm in size (subtending a visual angle of 35.348). False belief and true belief trials were presented using Stim2 software (Compumedics, Ltd) in a randomized order with the constraint that the same condition was not presented three times consecutively. Participants were instructed to watch the images, but their attention was not drawn to any particular aspect of the stimuli.
RESULTS
In order to characterize the observed effects, we applied 2 (condition: true belief, false belief) Â 2 (hemisphere: left, right) repeated measures ANOVAs to the relevant time windows, with Greenhouse-Geiser correction wherever the sphericity assumption had been violated. We also employed a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The mean amplitudes recorded within each specified time window were computed for each group of electrodes for the slow wave effects. For the LPC, the maximum value recorded within the specified time window was averaged across the group of electrodes included in the analysis. There were no significant effects of condition, laterality, or condition by laterality interaction (P's > 0.255) for the N1 recorded at the occipital locations.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to examine ERP responses to the passive viewing of actions incorporating true and false beliefs, without direct attention drawn by the experimenter to the manipulation prior to data collection. The results demonstrate that frontal and parietal activities, which has previously been reported in studies requiring participant's active response (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004 Liu et al., , 2009 , are present in a passive paradigm. We presume that frontal and parietal effects reflect, at least in part, the participant's online processing of belief characteristics of the observed individual.
A P200 component recorded at the parietal locations differentiated between conditions in which the character behaves in line with her true or false beliefs about reality, suggesting that although passive in nature, our task engages essential attentional mechanisms (Hopfinger and Magnum, 2001; Bartholow and Dickter, 2007) . The polarity of the P200 is in line with an interpretation of increased implicit attention for situations in which the character's behavior is due to a true representation of reality.
Consistent with previous studies, frontal, parietal and central LSW was associated with the mentalizing processes assessed by the passive false belief task (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004 Liu et al., , 2009b Meinhardt et al. 2011) . In the present study, this late occurring differentiation, between false-and true belief conditions, was found to be more wide spread than previously reported, encompassing central and centro-parietal locations, as well as being evident bilaterally. The frontal LSW with increased negativity for the false belief condition suggests that observing others' behaviors in the absence of a specifically explicit task involves, at least at a more global level, an implicit cognitive processing of the underlying mental states of the observed individual (Liu et al., 2009b; Meinhardt et al., 2011) . These frontal effects were paralleled by similar findings at parietal and central-parietal locations, which previously have been specifically associated with belief processing and not with other mental states such as desires (Liu et al., 2009a) . These results are of particular importance, as the electrical activity recorded at parietal scalp locations is thought to be related to TPJ activity (Liu et al., 2009a) . Functional neuroimaging studies show that TPJ activation is greater for belief reasoning compared to reasoning about internal bodily states or desires (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Powell, 2006) . Consequently, it is conjectured to be an essential component of a ToM network.
Unlike previous studies, the false belief task used in the current investigation did not elicit a P300 component at frontal or parietal locations, and the LSW effects were more diffuse or widespread, encompassing central locations (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004 Liu et al., , 2009b Meinhardt et al., 2011) . One potential explanation could be related to the fact that in previous studies, over repeated trials, participants build an expectation regarding the type of explicit response required. This induces differential use of attentional mechanisms between conditions (Meinhardt et al., 2011) . Also, most prior studies focus on investigating the ERP components associated with providing a response to a question about others' beliefs, which may be different than the processes involved in forming and activating a representation about other's mental states (Saxe, 2009) . Similarly, explicit judgments about others' beliefs may involve different control and cognitive processes (Liu et al., 2009 ) than the online implicit monitoring of others' mental states.
The present study has implications for work with infants and developing populations. Specifically, a clearer prediction for neural correlates can now be devised for developmental populations. The frontal, central and parietal activity seen in the present study should also be manifested as a neural correlate with similar cognitive properties, should behavioral studies that suggest the detection of ToM during infancy actually index that particular cognitive task. Such converging evidence would be highly beneficial for the developmental field. Given that passive paradigms are the norm in infant visual ERP studies (Reid and Geangu, 2008) , these results provide input into these future infancy studies regarding which regions and components may be most sensitive to manipulations in ToM, in paradigms that are best adapted to work with this population. Previous ERP studies with infants aged 7 and 9 months have already shown that paradigms depicting human goal-directed actions can yield a substantial number of artifact free trials with this population (Reid et al., 2009) . The stimuli presented in the current study are similar to those stimuli shown in prior work, which also vary in terms of the target object. This variation in observed human behavior is conjectured to make the stimuli more perceptually attractive for an infant population. It is therefore expected that a slightly older infant sample will attend to the stimuli used in the current study and provide a suitable amount of data per condition. Ensuring that the infant paradigm is as similar as possible to the adult paradigm will enable a closer comparison of any results.
In summary, the results of this study demonstrated that frontal ERP responses are related to detecting differences in belief in an observed individual. Some of the ERP components reported in prior work may be a consequence of paradigm constructions that require explicit responses from the participant (e.g. P300, N240-400). Further, to the extent that these variations in paradigm are reflected in variations in the resulting ERPs, these results suggest that responses recorded in the behavioral paradigms with infants are likely associated with the presence of developmental ERP components that are potentially more broadly distributed over frontal, central and parietal regions and have similar cognitive properties to the components initially identified by Sabbagh and Taylor (2000) and Liu et al. (2004 Liu et al. ( , 2009a Liu et al. ( , 2009b . Passively viewed sequences of true and false beliefs SCAN (2013) 
